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This paper assesses the impact of government fiscal policies on income inequality in Asia. It 
discusses the role and effectiveness of redistributive fiscal policies and quantifies the effects 
of taxation and government expenditure on income distributions. Panel estimation for 150 
countries with data between 1970 and 2009 confirms international empirical findings for 
Asia. Tax systems tend to be progressive but government expenditures are a more effective 
tool for redistributing income. Moreover, the results suggest some distinctive differential 
distributive effect for government expenditure on social protection in Asia. Social protection 
spending appears to increase income inequality, whereas it reduces it in the rest of the world. 
Also adversely affecting the distribution of income in Asia is government expenditure on 
housing. Some options for improving the effectiveness of fiscal policies in Asia are 
discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Asia’s rapid economic growth in recent decades has resulted in a substantial reduction in 
poverty and a dramatic improvement in welfare and the standard of living for a large 
proportion of the population. Although poverty reduction remains the main challenge for the 
region, widening income inequality is emerging as a concern. In recent years, Gini 
coefficients have risen in several developing Asian economies. At the same time, unequal 
access to basic social services, such as education and health, is seen as a significant problem 
which may be exacerbating growing income inequality. 
 
A variety of public policies have been used to improve the distribution of income and reduce 
inequality. These can be grouped into: (a) policies and strategies to make growth patterns 
more inclusive; (b) public spending (e.g. on education, health and social services) to enhance 
human capacity and enable everyone in society to participate in higher living standards; (c) 
taxation and direct income transfers that redistribute income from higher to lower income 
groups; and (d) governance and institutional reforms to level the playing-field and enable 
everyone in society to participate in and benefit from development on an equitable basis 
(such a labor market policy, social protection and safety nets, land distribution, anti-
corruption and anti-social exclusion). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate redistributive fiscal policies in Asia and other 
countries. It examines the impact of taxation and government expenditure and how effective 
they have been in reducing income inequality. 
 
Section II reviews the literature on the role and the effectiveness of redistributive fiscal 
policies. Section III discusses the methodology and data used to quantify the impact of 
taxation and government expenditure on income inequality. The estimation results, which 
show some striking differences in terms of the impact of fiscal policies in developing Asia 
and other countries, are presented in Section IV. Section V discusses how the effectiveness of 
fiscal policies in Asia may be improved and the last section concludes with some policy 
lessons. 
 
 
II. Review of the literature on the role and effectiveness of redistributive 
fiscal policies
2
 
 
A fair distribution of income being one of the most important goals of government policy has 
meant that a great deal of effort of research in economics has gone into conceptualizing and 
measuring how the revenue and expenditure sides of government budgets affect the 
distribution of income among households and individuals and how effective they are in 
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actually helping the poor. Formally, the study of these effects is known as tax and 
expenditure incidence. 
 
But besides taxes and expenditure programs, governments undertake an array of other 
policies, including monetary and exchange rate policies, which can have a large impact on 
income distribution, in particular on the welfare of the poor. Macroeconomic policies can 
have a significant impact on income distribution, through for example changes in 
unemployment or inflation.3 Besides macroeconomic policies, governments use a variety of 
other policy instruments that have significant direct and indirect impacts on the distribution 
of income and the welfare of the poor. These instruments include: price controls including on 
housing rents, minimum wages and interest rate controls on deposits and loans; foreign 
exchange rationing; import quotas and restrictions on exports. Therefore even though our 
focus here is on tax and expenditure incidence it is important to keep in mind that several 
other government policies can have an as large or larger potential impact on the distribution 
of income and on the welfare of the poor.  
 
Analyzing the incidence of taxes is important because who actually ends up paying the taxes 
is often quite different from those legally liable to make payment to the tax authorities. For 
example, a portion of social security contributions may have to be paid legally by employers 
but it is workers who may finally pay those charges in the form of unemployment or lower 
real wages. Similarly, establishing the incidence of government expenditures is important 
because not all expenditures benefit households and individuals of different income levels to 
the same extent. Even those government expenditures intended to benefit low income 
households may not do so because poor targeting or difficulties exist for the poor to have 
access to the public goods and services. For example, higher expenditures in primary 
education with lower expenditures in college education may tend to benefit the poor, but the 
effects may be mitigated by the lack of access of the poor in rural areas to schools. 
 
Clearly, incidence analysis is relevant because the impact of taxes and public spending on the 
distribution of income and the status of the poor is not immediate and general impressions 
about the impact may be plainly wrong. The analysis typically involves a mix of positive and 
normative issues. While the question of who pays is a positive one, judging its rightness is a 
normative question. Even though we should shy away from the analysis, it is important to 
always keep in mind facts from values. We should generally agree on the former but will 
need to reach consensus about the latter.  
 
Ultimately, tax and benefit incidence analysis is an effective tool to review whether 
government tax policies and expenditure programs have the desired impact on income 
distribution and on the poor. Seen from a proactive perspective, one main goal of fiscal 
incidence analysis is to contribute to the design of government policy. In this section we 
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provide an overview of the conceptual bases of incidence analysis, discuss some of the key 
measurement issues and main techniques used and summarize the empirical findings in 
previous studies. 
 
 
Tax incidence analysis 
 
Tax incidence, as the analysis of who ultimately bears the burden of government taxes in the 
economy, is covered in a vast literature in economics.4 Despite this vast literature, 
establishing firm final evidence on the distributional impact of different taxes remains a 
difficult activity because of the varying results depending on economic conditions and the 
sometimes complex feedback effects that operate through the entire economy. Because of 
this complexity, there has been always a grain of skepticism about the empirical findings in 
the tax incidence literature (Bird and de Wulf, 1973). However, our knowledge and 
understanding have improved greatly due to the analytical improvements of key economic 
issues in incidence analysis, greater data availability, in particular household income and 
expenditure surveys in many countries, and more powerful computational techniques such as 
microsimulation models and computable general equilibrium models.  
 
There are several key concepts in tax incidence analysis. First is the distinction between 
“statutory” (or legal) incidence and “economic” incidence, or those taxpayers who are by law 
required to pay the tax versus those taxpayers who ultimately bear the tax burden. The latter 
is what really counts. The “shifting” of taxes happens because the agents statutorily 
responsible to pay the taxes can alter their economic behavior and transfer or shift the 
burdens of taxes to other agents via changes in prices charged to consumers, wages paid to 
workers, or the return paid on investments. The degree of shifting depends on the elasticities 
of demand, supply and substitution in the use of inputs of production among the economic 
agents interacting in the activity or market being taxed. Economic agents with lower 
elasticities, that is, lower ability (or willingness) to react, are more likely to ultimately bear 
the burden of taxes. Because adapting or reacting to taxes takes time, the economic incidence 
of taxes will tend to be different in the short and the long runs. For example, capital owners 
may bear the burden of increased profit taxes in the short run but this burden can be shifted to 
workers in the longer run as decreased investment leads to lower productivity and wages and 
higher unemployment. 
 
Second, it is important to realize that taxes impose total burdens that go beyond the amounts 
actually collected by governments. This difference receives the name of “excess burdens” of 
taxes, also known as deadweight losses. The excess burdens arise because taxes lead to less 
efficient uses of economic resources and lower output and income in the economy as taxes 
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distort the choices by economic agents. For example, income taxes affect labor-leisure 
choices and saving and investment decisions.5  
 
Third, a significant difficulty in measuring the impact of taxes is to figure out what is the 
appropriate “counterfactual,” i.e. the situation before the taxes were implemented, that should 
be used as the benchmark in the measurement of the impact. Different choices of the 
counterfactual situation can be made, but there is always a difficulty in approximating the 
distribution of income that would have taken place in the absence of taxes.6 
 
 
The incidence of tax expenditures, negative income taxes and in-kind transfers 
 
To have a complete view of tax incidence we need to take into account the impact of tax 
expenditures, negative income taxes and in-kind transfers. Tax expenditures are special tax 
law provisions pursuing a variety of policy objectives and taking the form of exemptions, 
rebates, special deductions, tax credits or even special lower tax rates. The most immediate 
impact of tax expenditures is to reduce government revenues. Typically, by design, tax 
expenditures break with the principle of horizontal equity, i.e. that taxpayers who have the 
same income should pay the same amount in taxes. The impact of tax expenditures on 
vertical incidence, which holds that people with different incomes should pay different 
amounts of tax, can go either way. Tax expenditure can make a tax system more progressive 
(i.e. increase income equality) or more regressive (i.e. lower income equality), depending on 
a variety of public choice issues such as lobbying power. However, an important 
consideration is that tax expenditures cannot help the poor unless they pay taxes. And many 
of the poor do not pay taxes. This point highlights some of the limitations of redistributional 
policies from the tax side of the budget.  
 
However, an important amount of redistribution can be implemented via negative taxes. 
These cash transfers are targeted to the poor and are by nature highly progressive.7 However, 
there are some caveats in their application. To minimize fraud a sophisticated tax 
administration is required. In addition, stigma among the recipients can lead to low and 
uneven take-up of benefits, which may affect the assumed progressivity of this type of 
transfer. 
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The analysis of the incidence of in-kind transfers typically allocates to the different income 
groups receiving these transfers a monetary equivalent to the costs of providing the transfers.8 
Depending on the degree of participation by income group the transfer program will be more 
or less progressive. In-kind transfer programs such as food stamps tend to be quite 
progressive. However, not all in-kind transfer programs are progressive. For example, 
voucher programs for higher education tend to benefit higher income groups more than lower 
income groups because their uptake of higher education typically is proportionally higher, 
and so in general voucher programs are regressive. 
 
 
Three general methodologies for determining the impact of taxes on income distribution  
 
Three approaches have been used to estimate the distributional impact of taxes. The first, and 
most widely used, is microsimulation analysis using individual household data and 
conventional assumptions of tax incidence, the second is based on computable general 
equilibrium models for the entire economy and just a few representative individuals, and the 
third is based on econometric estimation models with more aggregate data. As we see below 
there are differences among those approaches in the tools and the type of data that are used, 
but fortunately the conclusions and findings tend to be in line with each other, although with 
sometimes significant nuances. 
 
Microsimulation conventional models of tax incidence. These models allocate tax burdens to 
different income groups, ordered from rich to poor by deciles or quintiles of the population, 
on the basis of a series of assumptions about who bears the final burden of taxes. For each 
tax, a portion of the revenues collected is imputed as tax burden to each income group in a 
way that exhausts the total revenues collected. For example, the revenues from excise taxes 
on tobacco products are allocated to different income groups in proportion to their relative 
share in the consumption of tobacco products. To arrive at an estimate of the incidence for 
the entire tax system, the incidence for each tax is calculated separately for each income 
group. These results are added up across all taxes for each income group to arrive at the total 
burden for each income group. Typically, the total burden is expressed as an average total tax 
rate, that is, the proportion of income paid in taxes by each income group. The information 
on total income, sources of income and expenditure patterns are typically obtained from data 
in household or consumer income and expenditure surveys. Taxes collected are obtained 
from the tax administration authorities.9  
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A critical step in the process is to make explicit the assumptions about shifting and final 
incidence, which are based on theoretical analyses albeit not always conclusive.10 Typically 
there has been wide agreement on the assumptions used for the different taxes and where 
there is no consensus the usual approach is to conduct sensitivity analysis to check how the 
results differ under alternative assumptions.11 What follows are the conventional assumptions 
for the main types of taxes:12 
 
o The individual income tax is typically assumed not to be shifted and thus it is assumed to 
be paid by the recipients of income.13 So in the presence of the usual progressive tax 
rates, this tax usually has a progressive incidence. 
o Payroll and social security taxes are typically assumed to be fully shifted to workers 
regardless of who is legally liable to pay the tax—at least a portion of this tax is typically 
imposed on the employers. In the presence of a cap on income for contributions—a 
frequent feature of this tax—its incidence is regressive. However, in developing countries 
where only workers in the formal sector pay this tax, its final incidence may be less 
regressive.  
o For the corporate income tax a variety of shifting assumptions have been proposed and 
analyzed for this tax including: (i) no shifting at all so that shareholders pay the full tax; 
(ii) the shifting to all capital owners through a leveling off or equalization of after-tax 
rates of return for all capital; (iii) the backward shifting to workers in the form of lower 
wages; and (iv) the forward shifting to consumers in the form of higher consumer prices 
in varying proportions depending on the degree of monopoly power assumed to exist in 
the markets. Perhaps the most commonly used assumption in the past has been that half 
of this tax burden is paid by all owners of capital and the other half is paid by consumers. 
More recently, with more open economies and high mobility of capital, there is more 
evidence that a significant part of this tax is paid by workers; this is generally more so the 
smaller and more open the economies are. 
o Taxes on goods and services, including several forms of sales taxes, value added taxes 
and excises, are practically all the time assumed to be shifted forward to consumers, i.e. 
they are assumed to be regressive. However, in the case of value added taxes, regressivity 
                                                                                                                                                 
1986; Bird and de Wulf, 1973). Conventional tax incidence has also been estimated by: (a) by factor shares 
in income (labor and capital); (b) calculating effective (average or marginal) tax rates by main economic 
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is reduced when multiple rates (lower for necessities and higher for luxury items) are 
used or basic goods and necessities are exempted.14 The incidence of sales taxes is 
complicated in many countries by the presence of cascading and multiple rates and 
exemptions.15 The regressivity conclusion for sales and value added taxes may not be 
correct for developing countries where only households operating in the formal sector, 
typically those with higher incomes, may pay those taxes. Furthermore, value added and 
excise taxes have been found to be considerably less regressive or even neutral when 
analyzed over a longer time frame or on life time basis rather than on the basis of current 
income.16 Excise taxes are also typically assumed to be shifted forward to consumers. 
Excise taxes can have a progressive impact as in the case of luxury goods (gasoline, cars, 
expensive liquor, or perfumes) and also a regressive impact (kerosene fuel used for 
cooking, tobacco products or cheap liquor). Customs tariffs or taxes on imports are 
typically assumed to have the same regressive incidence as sales and value added taxes 
for lack of better information regarding which income groups end up consuming the 
imported goods. 
o Export taxes, still present in some developing countries, have different incidence 
depending on the degree of monopoly power of exporters in international markets. Where 
monopoly power is present part of the export tax may be in effect exported to foreign 
consumers. Without monopoly power, the export taxes are assumed to be paid by the 
domestic exporters or producers. The final incidence of export taxes is regressive when 
the producers/exporters are small farmers of traditional export crops, or progressive if the 
producers/exporters are wealthy farmers or international companies. 
o Property tax incidence is typically more controversial. Some studies assume no shifting 
with the tax paid by the owners of the property or shifted to all owners of capital, in 
which case the tax is progressive. Others assume the forward shifting of property taxes to 
renters or users of the property, in which case they can be regressive.17 
 
The conventional approach to tax incidence presents advantages and disadvantages. On the 
positive side, the methodology is relatively simple and easy to implement, the underlying 
assumptions are transparent and the implications of alternative assumptions can be easily 
compared. The analysis can also include large samples of taxpayers. On the minus side, good 
information on income distribution is not always available and general equilibrium second 
round feedback effects are typically ignored. More importantly, the shifting assumptions 
which play a critical role in the results have been criticized for “stipulating” the incidence of 
various taxes (Devarajan et al., 1980). Moreover, increasing international evidence is finding 
higher income earners to be substantially more responsive to taxation than lower income 
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earners, shifting income across time and sources in response to tax policy changes.18 Such 
behavior would suggest less progressivity of the personal income tax system than what is 
typically assumed in microsimulation models. 
 
General equilibrium models of tax incidence. This approach to tax incidence was pioneered 
by Harberger (1962).19 The essence of this approach is to analyze the incidence of taxes 
within the context of a general equilibrium model of the economy, without making explicit 
assumptions about the final shifting of taxes. Instead, tax incidence is determined by the 
initial structure of the economy with the final outcome measured by observing the differences 
in the vector of equilibrium prices before and after the tax change. One of the greatest 
insights from this approach is that the final incidence of taxes depends on the values of 
several critical parameters in the economy, including the capital-labor ratios in different 
sectors and the elasticity of substitution in production among the different factors. Later on, 
Harberger’s model was operationalized by the development of computable general 
equilibrium models. These are relatively complex models, which attempt to capture in more 
detail the general equilibrium responses to taxes in the economy. The models are numerically 
solved using data from the national income accounts, household expenditure surveys and 
taxpayers’ data.20 General equilibrium models capture all the parameters that should play a 
role in final tax incidence among different income groups: different demand patterns, 
different endowments in resources and variations in capital-labor ratios in different economic 
sectors.21 
 
The general equilibrium approach also has its advantages and disadvantages. On the positive 
side, it employs an explicit structural model of the economy from first bases with 
utility/demand functions and production/supply functions. It also offers more transparency in 
how incidence results are linked to assumptions on fundamental parameters, such as the 
elasticity of substitution in production and the incidence results include measures of excess 
burdens. Moreover, general equilibrium models take into account indirect or second round 
feedback effects of taxation or government expenditure changes. On the minus side, general 
equilibrium models are operationally intensive and the number of taxpayers represented 
needs to be small. And even though this approach does not “stipulate” incidence results it 
does “stipulate” a long list of critical parameters, including elasticities of substitution in 
production and demand and supply (Fullerton and Rogers, 1991). 
 
Regression based estimates of the impact taxes on income distribution. A limited number of 
recent studies have used multivariate econometric analysis to investigate the impact of the tax 
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structure on the distribution of income across countries, typically measured via Gini 
coefficients. For example, Weller (2007) uses cross-country data from 1981 to 2002 and 
finds positive effects of progressive taxation on income distribution. Gwartney and Lawson 
(2006) use panel cross-country data on changes in marginal tax rates from 1980 to 2002 to 
examine their impact on the distribution of income and find that countries with the most 
significant high tax brackets rate reductions have experienced the largest increases in 
inequality over the sample period. More recently, Duncan and Sabirianova Peter (2008) 
derive a complete measure of income tax progressivity and find that inequality in the 
distribution of income is significantly affected by their measure of progressivity. Similarly, 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2011) find that higher reliance on direct over indirect taxes 
improves the income distribution over time for a large number of countries.  
 
A disadvantage of the multivariate econometric approach to tax incidence is that the impact 
of the different elements of the structure of taxes on income distribution cannot be examined 
in any detail, at least not to the extent allowed by the general equilibrium approach and 
especially microsimulation models. On the plus side, the econometric approach allows 
analyzing the impact of large variations in the level and structure of taxes across countries, 
variations that are unlikely observed within the context of a single economy. In all, the 
econometric approach should be considered a complement rather than a substitute for the 
microsimulation and general equilibrium approaches. 
 
 
Three important lessons on tax induced redistribution 
 
Three important lessons can be extracted from the large number of studies on tax incidence in 
the past. First, the vast majority of tax incidence studies in the last couple of decades have 
found that tax systems tend to be progressive or mildly progressive overall, although certain 
particular taxes within the system can be quite regressive. This finding is in contrast with 
earlier empirical studies of tax incidence dating back over five decades, which found tax 
systems to be regressive.22 Examples of recent studies include Messere (1997) for OECD 
countries, Shah and Whalley (1991) for several developing countries, Younger (1996) for 
Ghana, Younger et al. (1999) for Madagascar, Chen et al. (2001) for Uganda, Bahl et al. 
(1996) for Guatemala and Martinez-Vazquez (2001) for Mexico. 
 
Second, it is important to look at the incidence of the tax system as a whole. Some taxes, 
such as taxes that are capped, like payroll and social security taxes often are, tend to be by 
design more regressive and other taxes, such as income taxes, tend to be more progressive. 
Looking at tax incidence in a piecemeal fashion is likely to lead to inaccurate conclusions 
about the impact of the tax system on the distribution of income. It may also lead to 
abandoning or downplaying certain taxes that can play an important role in revenue 
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mobilization with relative efficiency or excess burden cost or that can be more easily 
administered. Incidence analysis needs to be performed within the big picture even when 
there are theoretical and practical difficulties in aggregating the results from the incidence of 
isolated taxes. 
 
Third, tax systems generally do not have a large impact on the distribution of income (Bird 
and Zolt, 2005; Harberger, 2006; Martinez-Vazquez, 2008).23  That is, governments’ capacity 
to redistribute income on the revenue side of the budget is limited even in OECD countries 
(Atkinson, 2000). This limitation may be more pronounced in the case of developing 
countries because the overall tax effort as a percent of GDP tends to be significantly smaller 
(Chu et al. 2000).  
 
 
Estimating the incidence of public expenditures  
 
From the perspective of income redistribution policies it is important to understand the 
incidence of public spending programs. As we have just seen above, tax policy has a limited 
ability to implement significant changes in the distribution of income, especially at the lower 
end of the income distribution. Even though a number of developed countries have 
implemented a variety of negative income taxes, which are in effect transfers, and provide a 
variety of tax credits and other favorable treatment to lower income households, the impact 
on the welfare of the poor still can be quite limited because these groups can be hard to reach 
and can be completely outside the tax system. More effective redistributional policies, 
especially vis-à-vis the poor, can be implemented from the expenditure side of the budgets.  
 
Therefore, it is important to understand the incidence of public expenditures programs. But 
the key difficulty in measuring the impact of public expenditure on individuals and 
households is that, with some rare exceptions, we are not able to measure output from 
government expenditures. How public expenditures impact different groups depends among 
other things on the composition of public expenditures, what programs are being 
implemented and how much funding is going to each, such as basic education versus 
university level education, or primary health care versus tertiary hospitals. The impact of 
public expenditure on the distribution of income depends also on the efficiency of 
government spending: the cost effectiveness of funds in delivering services and the matching 
of needs of people.  
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distribution. For example Li and Sarte (2004) find that the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 in the United 
States had a significant effect on income inequality, resulting in a 20 to 24 percent increase in the Gini 
coefficient for that country. 
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Approaches to measuring the impact of public expenditures on income distribution: Benefit 
incidence 
 
The basic problem in benefit incidence is how to measure the benefits accruing to individuals 
from public goods and services. In the case of private goods and services even though 
marginal private benefits are not directly observable, we can infer them from market prices.24 
In the case of public goods and services, many are provided without direct charges, and even 
when there is a fee or service charge, this price cannot be interpreted in general as the 
marginal benefit for individuals, because the supply of most public goods and services is 
subsidized or rationed, and it does not respond directly to demand.25  
 
Three general approaches have been used in the estimation of public expenditure incidence. 
The first methodology, known as the “benefit incidence” approach, uses the estimated inputs 
costs or marginal costs of provision for the public expenditure program as the measure for 
marginal benefits and it allocates those estimates to the different income groups depending 
on access to the service. The second methodology, known as the “behavioral approach,” uses 
estimates of behavioral demands for publicly provided goods and services to derive 
willingness to pay for the service by individuals. The third approach uses econometric 
techniques with aggregate data to analyze their differential impact on income distribution 
generally measured by Gini coefficients.26  
 
The benefit incidence approach. Also known as the classic or the non-behavioral approach, it 
was pioneered by twin World Bank studies by Selowsky (1979) for Colombia and Meerman 
(1979) for Malaysia.27 Formally, benefit incidence measures by how much the income of a 
household would have to be raised if the household had to pay for the subsidized public 
goods and services at full cost. The essence of the approach is to use information on the cost 
of publicly provided goods and services together with information on their use by different 
income groups to arrive at estimates of the distribution of benefits. Individual beneficiaries 
are typically grouped by income level but they can also be grouped by geographical area, 
ethnic group, urban and rural location, gender and so on. Information on individual or 
household use of the public goods and services is typically obtained from surveys, and it is 
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 Note that we do not use here the term “expenditure incidence” since this is typically used to measure the 
income flows government expenditures create in the provision of services, by hiring administrators, renting 
buildings, and so on. This type of measure has more relevance for interregional analyses but has less 
relevance in the context of impact on income distribution. 
25
 See van de Walle (1998) and Demery (2000) for two excellent and complete reviews of the issues.  
26
 Note that there are other methodologies used in economics that could also be used in the measurement of 
the incidence of public expenditures. The “indirect market technique” uses the indirect valuation of a public 
service as revealed by consumers with expenditures on private goods complementary to the public good, 
for example, employing estimates of time and money spent on complementary goods to use public parks 
(Bradford and Hildebrandt, 1977 and Maler, 1971). A second technique is the “contingent valuation” 
method employed in environmental economics using direct questionnaires and surveys of consumers or in 
an experimental lab setting (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). 
27
 For more recent studies that have used the benefit incidence approach see, for example, Selden and 
Wasylenko (1992) and Demery (2000).   
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fundamental to know how effectively public expenditure programs target the poor. Because 
of the required information on unit costs in the provision of public goods and services and the 
rate of use of those services by different individuals, in practice, benefit incidence has been 
estimated for three main categories of public goods and services: education, health and some 
types of infrastructure.  
 
The benefit incidence approach has several strengths but also weaknesses. On the positive 
side, it provides simplicity and transparency of estimation procedures and allows studying 
which public expenditure programs are most effective in reaching and improving the status of 
the poor. On the negative side, the cost measures may not be a good enough approximation of 
true benefits or marginal valuations of the public good or service provided and it cannot 
incorporate changes in the behavior of individuals in response to changes in public 
expenditure. For example, we may find that poor households may not send their children to 
school but benefit incidence does not suggest why nor provide a course of policy action. The 
scope is limited to public expenditure programs for which private beneficiaries can be 
identified.  The approach can also ignore important interaction effects with the private sector. 
For example, if the private education sector is able to attract a higher number of richer 
students, benefit incidence of education becomes more progressive. If the quality of 
education depends, among other things, on peer pressure, the lower number of children of 
better educated and wealthier families in public schools may reduce the quality of public 
education for the poor. 
 
The behavioral approach: marginal willingness to pay. In essence, this approach uses 
individual preferences to derive marginal willingness to pay as the measure of individual 
benefits from public expenditures.28 The methodology consists of using econometric methods 
to exploit variation in behaviors in the use of public goods and services, prices, incomes and 
other household characteristics across individuals and time to estimate demand functions for 
public goods and services. These demand functions generate price elasticities and willingness 
to pay generally varying by income groups. With that information one can estimate the 
incidence of public spending programs, in particular whether they have a pro-poor incidence 
and whether the poor may have a more elastic response to any changes in costs associated 
with the use of the service. Discerning the behavioral impact of public expenditure programs 
opens up possibilities for the better design of public policies and in particular for better 
targeting expenditures to the poor.  
 
The behavioral approach also has several strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, this 
approach is more theoretically sound with clear foundations in microeconomics and it allows 
the estimation of incidence for public expenditures for which specific users cannot be 
identified. And as we have seen, it incorporates individual behavioral responses and therefore 
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 This approach was pioneered by Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) and Gertler and Glewwe (1990) and 
Younger (1999), although demand curves for public goods have been used before to derive willingness to 
pay for public goods; see, for example, Martinez-Vazquez (1982).  
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it provides concrete guidance for policy reform. On the negative side, this approach is more 
data intensive and methodologically more complex. 
 
Behavioral and benefit incidence approaches can be quite complementary. For example, 
interesting application of benefit and behavioral approaches are employed by Younger (1999) 
and Ravallion et al. (1995).  
 
Regression based estimates of the impact of government expenditures on income distribution. 
Even though it is widely acknowledged that a variety of government spending programs can 
have a positive effect in reducing income inequality, regression based estimates, going as far 
back as Tanzi (1974), have shown that what in many instances would seemingly be perceived 
as redistributive government spending may do nothing to improve income inequality and may 
actually worsen it. The difficulties involved in targeting distributional expenditure policies 
which has been discussed in many studies (e.g. Aspe and Sigmund, 1984; Aspe, 1993; 
Birdsall and James, 1993; Harberger, 1998; Schwartz and Ter-Minassian, 2000). Despite this 
problem, many education and health spending programs have been found to be equalizing 
and poverty reducing (Paternostro et al., 2007). Others have found that infrastructure 
spending in some developing countries has resulted in large poverty reduction, for example, 
Klump and Bonschab (2004) in the case of Vietnam.29 In the recent literature much more 
emphasis has been placed on the relationships between growth and income distribution 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2000) and public spending and growth (Afonso et al., 2005; Herrera, 
2007; Moreno-Dodson, 2008; Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson, 2010; Day and Yang, 2011). It 
is now quite clear that the quantity and quality of growth is affected by public expenditure 
and growth in turn affects the distribution of income. 
 
For those few studies that have more explicitly focused on the wide impact of public 
expenditure on income distribution, either for a particular country or in cross country 
analyses, the evidence is mixed. For example, de Mello and Tiongson (2006) in a cross-
country analysis (the sample running from 27 to 56 countries depending on availability of 
data) of the impact of government spending on income distribution find the overall effects of 
expenditures to be un-equalizing. In fact, those countries where redistribution is most needed 
due to high inequality, they are also less likely to have effective redistributive policies in 
place. In a country case study for Brazil, Clements (1997) similarly finds that government 
social expenditures have contributed to exacerbate income inequalities. On the other hand, 
Jao (2000) finds that in the case of Taipei, China public expenditures on social assistance and 
social insurance contributed positively in reducing income inequality. In a more recent study, 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2011) using panel data for a large number of countries find that 
aggregate public expenditures on social welfare, education, health and housing have a 
positive significant effect on reducing income inequality. 
 
                                                 
29
 But here again the rent seeking behavior of the elite can change the outcomes, as identified by Araujo et 
al. (2008) for Ecuador and Khemani (2010) for India. 
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The multivariate regression approach to the analysis of public expenditure incidence has 
some clear advantages but also disadvantages, and therefore should be considered a 
complement rather than a substitute for the benefit incidence and behavioral approaches. One 
of the most important advantages is to be able to analyze the impact on income distribution of 
large variations in levels of expenditures and their composition across countries, variations 
that are often not observed within the context of country-case studies. Multivariate analysis 
also allows examining the evolution over time of the impact of different government 
expenditures on income distribution within countries. On the other hand, the analysis of 
income distribution at the aggregate country level does not allow the introduction in the 
analysis of specific details on policies and institutions that can make a significant difference 
on the effectiveness and overall impact of public expenditure policies. For example, two 
countries can have similar expenditures on primary education and health but one of these 
countries can do a much greater effort in targeting the access to these services by poor rural 
or urban families. This type of information is likely not to be available for a large number of 
countries and therefore is likely to be ignored in multivariate regression studies. If the 
information is available, there may be the possibility of using dummy variables to account for 
those effects. Also, to the extent that institutions and policy approaches do not change over 
time their impact can be controlled for by using fixed effect panel estimation approaches. 
 
 
Important lessons from public expenditure induced redistribution  
 
An important conclusion from the review of the empirical literature on the incidence of 
public expenditures is that spending programs on social welfare and the social sectors have 
the capability of significantly affecting income distribution. However, the actual impact on 
reducing income inequality depends crucially on the targeting of those expenditures to the 
poor and lower income groups in the income distribution (Selowsky, 1979; Meerman, 1979; 
Gertler and Glewwe, 1990; Selden and Wasylenko, 1992; Younger, 1999).  
 
The methodologies currently available have led incidence studies of public expenditures to 
concentrate only on a small number of sectors, mainly those of education, health and basic 
utilities. The incidence of public education expenditures generally varies with the level of 
education services. Primary and perhaps secondary education tend to be pro-poor and reduce 
inequality in the distribution of income. On the other hand, public expenditures on higher 
education or university level typically benefit the rich and lead to higher inequality in the 
distribution of income; van de Walle and Nead (1995) review the experiences of 13 countries 
which generally support this conclusion. The incidence of health expenditures tends to be 
also differentiated depending on the type of programs. Public expenditures on primary care 
tend to be more pro-poor and improve the distribution of income. Public expenditures on 
more sophisticated types of health care tend to be pro-rich and make the distribution of 
income more unequal; evidence on these effect are presented, for example, in Sahn and 
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Younger (2000). Finally, the incidence of expenditures on utility infrastructure tends to be 
pro-rich.  
 
 
As a manner of conclusion 
 
Most tax systems tend to show a mildly progressive incidence impact. However, around the 
world taxes have not been a very effective means of redistributing income. One reason for 
this is the potentially large excess burdens or economic losses associated with highly 
progressive taxation. Riding between revenue and expenditure policies depending on how 
they get implemented, direct cash transfers and in-kind transfers can be quite progressive 
unless there are serious targeting problems. The international experience shows that the 
expenditure side of the budget (including transfers) can have a more significant impact on 
income distribution. Expenditure programs in the social sectors (education and health) are 
more progressive the more is spent in relative and absolute terms on those goods and services 
more frequently used by the poor (basic education and primary health care). However, the 
effective targeting of lower income groups in expenditure programs is hard to design and to 
implement. 
 
These general findings and conclusions about the effectiveness of redistributive fiscal 
policies tend to hold for different methodological approaches in the tools and the type of data 
that are used. Whether they also hold for Asian countries is investigated next. 
 
 
III. Estimating the impact of fiscal policies on income inequality: 
methodology and data 
 
To examine the redistributive impact of fiscal policies in Asia, we derive regression based 
estimates of the effects of taxation and government expenditures on income distribution. This 
section discusses the methodology and data. A description of the variables used in the 
estimation and their sources is contained in Appendix A. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
To quantify the impact of taxation and government expenditure on income inequality we 
estimate the following equation 
 
giniit = α giniit-1 + ( Fit’ , Asiait * Fit’ ) γ + Xit’ β + υi + εit for i = 1, …, N and t = 1, …T (1) 
 
Equation (1) posits that income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, giniit, for 
country i in year t, is a function of income inequality in the previous year, giniit-1, the fiscal 
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variables of interest, Fit, which are various tax and government expenditure variables and a 
set of observable control variables that is commonly used in the literature to explain income 
inequality, Xit. The lagged dependent variable is included because income inequality is 
persistent over time. To identify Asia specific tax and government expenditure effects, a 
dummy variable, Asiait, which equals one if a country is in Asia and zero otherwise, is 
interacted with the variables of interest.30 υi are unobserved country fixed effects and εit are 
idiosyncratic errors. They are assumed to be independently distributed across and have the 
following error components structure 
 
E ( υi ) = 0, E ( εit ) = 0, E ( εit υi ) = 0 for i = 1, …, N and t = 2, …T (2) 
 
and 
 
E ( εit εis ) = 0 for i = 1, …, N and t ≠ s (3) 
 
The estimation of equation (1) raises four potential problems. First, the lagged dependent 
variable, giniit, is correlated with the country-specific fixed effects, υi, (Nickell, 1981). 
Moreover, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates may be biased if the lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with other explanatory variables, i.e. the fiscal variables, Fit, or the 
control variables, Xit, (Baum, 2006). This bias arises even if the error process is independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Second, the tax and public expenditure variables in Fit may 
not be strictly exogenous and correlated with the idiosyncratic errors, εit. Third, the time-
invariant unobserved country fixed effects, υi, may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables, Fit, or Xit. Fourth, our panel dataset has a relatively short time dimension (T = 30) 
and a relatively large country dimension (N = 150). When the time period is short, the 
dynamic panel bias that arises due to the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with 
the fixed effect in the error term may be significant. In this case, applying a straightforward 
fixed effects estimator would not be appropriate (Roodman, 2006). 
 
To address the four potential problems we use methodology proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998), which augments the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. The Bundell and Bond 
estimator is designed for small T and large N panel dataset with independent variables that 
are not strictly exogenous, with fixed effects and heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
within countries. The Arellano and Bond estimator differences all the regressors and uses 
Hansen’s (1982) General Method of Moments as proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). The 
Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator aumgents Arellano and Bond (1991) by assuming that 
the first differences of instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This 
allows the use of more instruments and improves efficiency. The Blundell and Bond 
estimator combines two equations, one in levels and one in first-differences. The equation in 
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 We include the following countries in Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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levels uses lagged first-differences as instruments for the endogenous variables (lagged Gini 
coefficients and fiscal variables), whereas the equation in first-differences uses lagged levels 
as instruments. The validity of these instruments is tested using the standard Sargan test for 
over-identifying restrictions. 
 
The Blundell and Bond system GMM estimator helps overcome the four potential problems 
as follows. First differencing of equation (1) eliminates the country fixed effects because they 
do not vary over time. This resolves the third problem (fixed effects) and the endogeneity of 
the lagged dependent variable (first problem) as long as the idiosyncratic errors, εit, are not 
serially correlated. In the level equation, differences in the instruments are used to make them 
exogenous to the fixed effects.31 Applying GMM overcomes the potential problem of biased 
OLS estimates due to the lagged dependent variable being correlated with other explanatory 
variables. 
 
The second problem of the fiscal variables being correlated with the idiosyncratic errors 
arises if there is reverse causality between income inequality and fiscal policies. A large 
number of factors likely influence government policies and may include income inequality. 
For instance, countries with greater income disparity may choose to rely relatively more on 
direct taxation and/or social expenditures. This means that fiscal policies may affect income 
inequality but also that income inequality may affect fiscal policies. To address this 
endogeneity problem, one would usually choose instrumental variables estimation (two stage 
least squares). However, finding valid external instruments for all the different tax and 
government expenditure variables is a challenge. The Bundell and Bond system GMM 
estimator helps overcome the potential endogeneity problem and lack of external 
instrumental variables by drawing instruments from within the dataset. It instruments 
differences with levels and levels with differences. The validity of these instruments again 
depends on the assumption that εit, are serially uncorrelated. 
 
The system GMM estimator also deals with the fourth problem of relatively small-T large-
N.32 Blundell and Bond (1998) show that it is superior to Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
difference GMM estimator, which has poor finite sample properties and is downward biased 
when T is relatively small. 
 
The data used in the estimation (discussed next) is an unbalanced panel dataset where the 
number of time periods observed is not the same for all countries and even for the same 
country the number of observations available may differ by the type of variable. The 
econometric model estimates the objective equation (1) by using all available information 
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 Tests of serial correlation in the first differenced residuals are consistent with the assumption of no serial 
correlation in εit. 
32
 In large-T panels, a shock to the country-specific fixed effect declines with time. Similarly, the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term is insignificant (Roodman, 2006). In these 
cases, using the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator would not be necessary. 
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from the sample. The final number of observations and number of countries used in the 
estimation of a particular specification depends on the number of observations for which all 
included variables have non-missing values. 
 
 
Data 
 
The estimation uses data from 150 developed, developing and transition economies, between 
1970 and 2009. 22 of the 150 countries are from Asia. However, low data coverage often 
significantly reduces the number of observations used in each regression. 
 
Income inequality is measured by Gini coefficients from the UNU-WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database. They are computed on the basis of income/consumption distribution 
data. Inequality estimates can be based on gross or net income (i.e. income before or after the 
deduction of taxes and social contributions) or expenditure. To account for this heterogeneity 
in the Gini coefficients, we include two dummies for gross and net income and the 
consumption measure is considered as the base category.33 
 
We consider the following tax variables: personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax 
(CIT), social security contributions (SSC) and payroll taxes, general taxes on goods and 
services (GTGS), excises and customs duties, all measured as a percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Personal and corporate income taxes are generally thought to be progressive 
and hence should reduce income inequality. However, when evaluating the impact of 
personal income taxes on income inequality, it is important to take into account the level of 
progressivity. For that reason, we interact personal income tax revenue with a personal 
income tax progressivity measure constructed by Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010). The 
progressivity measure is based on countries’ personal income tax system, including 
information on statutory tax rates, tax brackets, country-specific tax legislation, basic 
allowances, standard deductions, tax credits, national surcharges and local taxes. We use 
Sabirianova Peter et al.’s average rate progression variable, which is derived as follows. 
Average tax rates are first computed for each country for each year at 100 different levels of 
pre-tax income, which are evenly spread in the range from 4 to 400 percent of a country’s 
GDP per capita. The average rates (for each country and each year) are then regressed on the 
log of the 100 income data points that are formed around per capita GDP. A country’s tax 
structure in a particular year is interpreted as progressive, neutral or regressive if the 
estimated slope coefficient is positive, zero or negative. 
 
When assessing the impact of corporate income tax revenue, it is important to take into 
account that the progressivity of corporate income taxes may be affected by countries’ 
openness. In his seminal paper on incidence of corporate income tax, Harberger (1962) 
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 See the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) for more information on the concepts 
of measuring income inequality. 
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shows that in a closed economy with two perfectly competitive sectors and fully mobile 
factors of production, imposing a tax on capital in one sector would cause capital to move 
from the taxed to the untaxed sector, further causing a reallocation of labor among the two 
sectors and changes in factor and output prices. Using elasticities typical for the U.S. 
economy, Harberger finds that, in these circumstances, capital bears approximately the full 
burden of the corporate income tax. In his two more recent papers, Harberger (1995, 2006) 
revisits the incidence of corporate income taxes in an open economy where capital can flow 
freely across international borders. In this setting, he finds that the burden of corporate tax 
more than fully shifts to labor. To account for these effects, we interact the corporate income 
tax variable with a globalization index. 
 
Social security contributions and payroll taxes are commonly shared between employees and 
employers. However, employers tend to almost entirely shift the burden to employees in the 
form of lower wages. Social security contributions and payroll taxes are expected to increase 
income inequality if there is a cap on income for contribution. The lower is the cap, the more 
regressive are the taxes. 
 
The evidence on the impact of taxes on goods and services, including value added taxes and 
excises, on income inequality is mixed. Studies that analyze current income generally find 
that they are regressive. But this regressivity is reduced substantially and may even become 
neutral when analyzed over a longer time frame. The sign on the coefficient for general taxes 
on goods and services and excises could therefore be negative or not significantly different 
from zero. For lack of better information we expect customs duties to have the same direction 
of effect on income inequality as general taxes on goods and services. 
 
On the government spending side, we consider four types of expenditure: on social 
protection, education, health and housing, all expressed as a percent of GDP. Ideally, we 
would have included subcomponents of these expenditure categories, e.g. basic education 
versus university level education, or primary health care versus tertiary hospitals, as they are 
likely to affect income groups differently. However, internationally comparable 
disaggregated data on government spending is not available. Bearing this in mind, we would 
expect higher government spending on social protection, education, health and housing to 
reduce income inequality. 
 
The choice of control variables is based on significance identified in the literature. Previous 
studies have found that economic and social variables that influence labor supply, labor 
demand and institutions are important determinants of income inequality (Blejer and 
Guererro, 1990; Feenberg and Poterba, 1993; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Mocan, 1999). 
Changes in labor supply and labor demand have an impact on income inequality because they 
alter wages. Factors that affect labor supply include population size, age structure and 
education, while labor demand tends to be influenced by technological change, international 
trade and outsourcing. The quality of institutions is thought to be important because it affects 
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the allocation of resources. For example, high political corruption allows certain interest 
groups to influence policy-makers to implement policies that do not necessarily benefit low-
income groups. 
 
Based on data availability, we include the following control variables: population growth, 
youth dependency, old-age dependency, a globalization index, GDP per capita, long-term 
unemployment, perception of corruption, schooling and size of government. They are 
expected to have the following impact on income inequality. 
 
An increase in population growth raises labor supply, which lowers wages. A decline in 
wages in turn is expected to increase income inequality. Higher youth dependency, which is 
defined as the ratio of the number of persons ages 0–15 to the number of persons ages 16–64, 
is expected to result in greater income inequality, mainly because higher youth dependency 
suggests a higher average number of children per household and lower household per capita 
income. Old-age dependency, on the other hand, which is defined as the ratio of persons ages 
65 or over to the number of persons ages 16–64, has generally been associated with relatively 
lower income inequality. This may be because of a flatter income profile of this age group. 
 
The schooling variable, which measures the average number of years of schooling in 
countries, captures the potential effect that the level of education of individuals has on 
income inequality. A higher level of education is expected to increase the income of 
households and individuals and should reduce income inequality. Similarly, higher, long-
term unemployment is associated with an increase in income inequality because it reduces 
the ability of people to earn income. 
 
Kuznets in his seminal 1955 paper argued that as countries develop, income disparity first 
increases, peaks and then decreases. To capture these effects, which Kuznets documented 
using both cross-country and time-series data, GDP per capita and per capita GDP squared 
are included in the estimation. 
 
Technological progress and globalization of trade and finance have been found to be growth 
enhancing and poverty reducing, but they have tended to increase income inequality both in 
advanced and developing countries (IMF, 2007). To capture the potential negative effect of 
globalization on income inequality, we use the KOF index (Dreher, 2006 and Dreher et al., 
2008), which takes values between 0 and 100 (a higher value meaning greater globalization). 
The globalization index takes into account actual economic flows (e.g. trade, foreign direct 
investment), economic restrictions (e.g. import barriers, tariff rates), data on information 
flows (e.g. internet users, trade in newspapers), data on personal contact (e.g. telephone 
traffic, international tourism) and data on cultural proximity. 
 
Few studies have considered the impact of corruption on income inequality. The rare studies 
that investigate this relationship find that corruption increases income inequality (Gupta et al. 
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2002). Corruption distorts the economic and financial environment. This in turn affects 
people’s ability to earn income. We measure corruption with the ICRG’s assessment of 
corruption within the political system. It takes values from 0 to 6 with a higher value 
indicating more corruption. 
 
In addition, the size of government may matter. Larger governments may be more able to 
meet the demands of lower income households and individuals through different social 
programs, leading to better distributional outcomes. The size of government is measured by 
total revenue as a percent of GDP.34 
 
We also include inflation as a control variable. This is because inflation is one of the most 
regressive taxes that any government can implement. An increase in inflation, measured by 
annual percent changes in consumer prices, is expected to raise income inequality because of 
two main effects. First, high and rising inflation typically coincides with low and falling real 
interest rates of (unindexed) financial securities as prices and inflation expectations, and 
hence nominal interest rates, only adjust sluggishly. High and rising inflation thus leads to an 
erosion of the real value of financial assets and gains on debt. Lower income households 
disproportionately loose because they cannot borrow or borrow as much as higher income 
households, and the real value of their debt declines by less. Also, they tend to hold less real 
assets, like houses or land, which can help protect against the adverse effects of inflation and 
a larger proportion of their assets is in (unindexed) bank and term deposits. Second, higher 
inflation is expected to raise income inequality because of “fiscal drag”. When income tax 
thresholds are not adjusted for inflation, rising nominal incomes move people into higher 
income tax rate brackets. Lower income people are more affected by fiscal drag than higher 
income people in the top income tax bracket, whose marginal tax rate cannot increase any 
further. 
 
 
IV. Results 
 
This section discusses the estimation results. Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. In 
the first part we focus only on the effects of taxation and personal income tax progressivity 
on income inequality. Similarly, in the second part we investigate only the effects of 
government spending on income distributions, while in the third part we include both 
taxation and government expenditure to evaluate their joint effect on income inequality in 
Asia and other countries. 
 
The estimation results are reported in Appendixes B-D. Column (1) in Appendix B shows the 
results from including the control variables only. Most of the variables are statistically 
significant and have the predicted sign. The results for inflation, which is a variable not 
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 Note that the size of government variable is included when analyzing tax instruments individually and 
when assessing types of expenditure.  It is dropped in the estimations that include all taxes. 
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typically included in income inequality studies, suggest that rising consumer prices adversely 
affect income inequality. A one percentage point increase in inflation, on average, raises 
inequality between 0.033 and 0.132 percentage points. 
 
 
Taxation and income inequality 
 
Table 1 reports the estimated marginal impact of taxation on income inequality from 
individually including alternative tax instruments. Personal income tax revenue (PIT) has the 
expected negative impact on income inequality, and the effect is significantly higher in Asia 
than in the rest of the world. A one percentage point increase in PIT in Asia reduces income 
inequality by around 0.573 percentage points compared to 0.041 percentage points in the rest 
of the world. The finding of a greater redistributive effect of personal income taxation may be 
due to a larger number of people not paying income tax in Asia because their income is 
below a tax free threshold. A larger share of informal employment may also be a contributing 
factor. 
 
The overall impact of progressive income tax scales (personal income tax*progressivity) is 
small and somewhat smaller in Asia than in the rest of the world. A one percentage point 
increase in PIT progressivity reduces income inequality by around 0.002 percentage points in 
Asia compared to 0.005 in the rest of the world. 
 
Table 1: Estimated marginal impact of taxation on income inequality (in percentage points) 
 Asia Rest of the world 
Personal income tax -0.573 -0.041 
Personal income tax*progressivity -0.002 -0.005 
Corporate income tax 0.598 -0.338 
Corporate income tax*globalization -0.017 0.005 
Social security and payroll taxes 1.324 0.165 
General taxes on goods and services 0.666 0.768 
Excises 0.609 -0.059 
Customs duties 0.174 0.651 
 
Including corporate income tax revenue (CIT) in the estimation suggests that corporate 
income taxation reduces income disparity in the rest of the world but that it is regressive in 
Asia.35 A one percentage point increase in CIT raises income inequality by around 0.598 
percentage points. This regressivity of CIT in Asia may be due to larger tax concessions and 
subsidies for firms. However, interacting CIT with globalization reverses the sign. CIT 
interacted with globalization lowers inequality, which is the opposite from what is expected 
                                                 
35
 The correlation coefficient between the Gini coefficient and CIT in Asia is about 0.06.  
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and what is observed in the rest of the world. The finding may be due to higher effective tax 
rates for foreign firms in Asia compared to domestic firms and than in the rest of the world. 
 
Theory on the incidence of social security contributions and payroll taxes (SSC+Payroll) 
suggests that imposing these types of tax results in lower wages and higher unemployment. 
While these taxes are commonly levied equally between employers and employees, they are 
typically shifted to employees in the form of lower wages, ultimately resulting in increased 
income inequality. The results in Table 1 provide support to this hypothesis, especially in 
Asia where the estimated effect of social security contributions and payroll taxes on income 
inequality is substantially larger than in the rest of the world (1.324 compared to 0.165). 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the effect of general taxes on goods and services (GTGS) on 
income inequality is mixed. Our results for Asia and for the rest of the world support the 
hypothesis that they are regressive. The results suggest that a one percentage point increase in 
GTGS in Asia increases income inequality by around 0.666 percentage points compared to 
0.768 in the rest of the world. Somewhat less regressive general taxes on goods and services 
could be due to lower tax compliance in Asia. Moreover, Asia may have a greater number of 
small businesses not charging value added taxes (VAT), for example, because their sales are 
below VAT registration thresholds. Finally, excises and customs duties are also found to be 
regressive in Asia. The results in Table 1 show an estimated effect of 0.609 percentage points 
for excises and 0.174 percentage points for customs duties. 
 
 
Government spending and income inequality  
 
Next, we examine the effect of government spending on income inequality. Table 2 reports 
the estimated marginal impact of the different types of government spending on income 
inequality.  Including only social protection expenditure in the estimation reduces the sample 
size by 35 percent, partly reflecting that many countries do not have social safety nets. The 
estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in social protection expenditure raises 
income inequality in Asia by 0.49 percentage points. In the rest of the world, social 
protection spending has the expected negative sign, i.e. it reduces income inequality. 
 
Social protection expenditures consist of two large components, namely, (i) services and 
transfers provided to individuals and households, and (ii) expenditures on services provided 
on a collective basis (IMF, 2001). Collective social protection services include formulation 
and administration of government policy, formulation and enforcement of legislation and 
standards for providing social protection, and applied research and experimental development 
into social protection services. Asian countries provide relatively few services and transfers 
and the second component is likely to dominate. The unexpected positive effect of social 
protection on income inequality suggests that government policies and legislative 
enforcement etc., the second component of social protection expenditure, may benefit higher 
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income households and individuals more than lower income people. To test this hypothesis, 
information on the structure of social protection expenditures would be needed, which, 
however, is not available. Moreover, the unexpected positive effect of social protection may 
be due to a narrow benefit coverage and a lack of targeting to the poor for the few services 
and transfers that Asian countries provide. 
 
For education, the results suggest that government expenditures in Asia have a larger 
negative effect on income inequality than education spending in other countries. In case of 
expenditures on health, we find that in Asia this type of expenditure has a somewhat lower 
negative effect on income inequality than in the rest of the world. On the other hand, the 
estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in housing expenditure raises income 
inequality in Asia by 2.162 percentage points, vis-à-vis the rest of the world where housing 
spending has the expected negative sign, i.e. it tends to reduce income inequality.  
 
Table 2: Estimated marginal impact of government spending on income inequality (in 
percentage points) 
 Asia Rest of the world 
Social protection 0.490 -0.276 
Education -0.486 -0.034 
Health -0.241 -0.330 
Housing 2.162 -0.614 
 
 
Joint effect of taxation and government spending on income inequality 
 
Finally, we include both taxation and government expenditure to evaluate their joint effect on 
income inequality in Asia and other countries. Including all the variables accounts for 
scenarios where governments use all the fiscal instruments to affect income inequality. 
Appendix D presents the findings. The first column reports the estimates with all the tax 
variables, the second column with all the government expenditure variables, and the third 
column includes both all tax and all expenditure variables. The results, however, should be 
interpreted with caution. In the joint estimation a considerable amount of degrees of freedom 
is lost due to missing data. Moreover, we had to drop the interaction terms between the tax 
and dummy variables for Asia in the third estimation (including both all tax and all 
expenditure variables) because of multicollinearity. 
 
Overall, the results support our earlier finding that social protection expenditure has a 
distinctive differential distributive effect in Asia compared to the rest of the world. Social 
protection spending appears to increase inequality, while in the rest of the world it has a 
negative effect on income distribution. The joint estimations also confirm previous findings 
that housing policies seem to benefit higher income people in Asia to a larger extent than 
lower income people compared to the rest of the world. Note however, that housing policies 
26 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
in the rest of the world are now also regressive, whereas they reduced inequality when 
included on their own. 
 
In the case of education, we find that when all four government expenditure policies are 
taken into account, spending on education reduces income inequality in Asia somewhat than 
in the rest of the world, whereas previously it had a slightly larger impact. The opposite holds 
true for health expenditure. Health spending lowers income inequality in Asia somewhat 
more than in the rest of the world in the joint estimation compared to the regression that 
includes health expenditure only. 
 
For taxation, the results from the joint estimation provide further support to the finding that 
tax policies may not have a large impact on the distribution of income and this seems to be 
the case both in Asia and in the rest of the world. The results from including all the tax 
variables (but not the expenditure variables) show that the tax variables are jointly 
statistically significant but not individually except for the progressivity measure interacted 
with personal income tax in the rest of the world. Moreover, the signs on the tax variables 
reverse in several instances. Based on these results, we are therefore unable to conclude in 
any reliable manner that taxes are effective in redistributing income. At best, they may have a 
small impact both in Asia and the rest of the world. 
 
 
V. Improving the effectiveness of fiscal policies in Asia 
 
The review of the literature and our empirical results suggest that more effective 
redistributional policies can be implemented with spending programs on social welfare and 
the social sectors, such as health and education policies, than with taxes. However, taxation is 
crucial to raise financing for government expenditure to achieve distributional objectives. 
This section discusses the effectiveness of tax systems and tax administration in collecting 
tax revenue in Asia. Our focus is on corporate and personal income taxation and value added 
taxes as payroll and social security taxes are less important in Asian countries and tax 
revenues from foreign trade taxes, including custom duties, are declining with rising trade 
liberalization. The section also briefly discusses government spending policies on education, 
health and social protection to throw more light on the econometric findings presented in the 
previous section. Housing is excluded from the discussion because of lack of readily 
available data and information. 
 
 
Tax systems 
 
Taxes create economic costs because they distort economic behavior. A theoretically optimal 
tax that minimizes the behavioral impact of taxation is one that taxes activities according to 
their varying responses to the tax (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). In practice, however, such 
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an approach is not feasible because it is constrained by principles of fairness and simplicity, 
and because of the difficulties to reliably measure the tax sensitivity of particular activities. 
Practically speaking, an efficient tax system is one that reduces the disincentive effects of 
taxation to work, save and invest by using broad bases and low fairly uniform rates. A broad 
base, low rate system also lowers administration and compliance costs, leaving more 
resources for productive activities, and is often seen as more fair than a narrow base system 
because of horizontal and vertical equity considerations (Tanzi, 2011). 
 
 
Composition of taxes 
 
Corporate income taxation is an important part of countries’ tax systems. Figure 1 plots 
corporate income tax revenue as a percent of GDP and (statutory) corporate income tax rates 
in Asia compared to three country averages: all countries, OECD countries and developing 
countries excluding Asia. It shows that Malaysia and Vietnam, at 8.1 and 7.7 percent, have 
the highest level of corporate income tax, while Indonesia, Cambodia and Bangladesh have 
the lowest, at 1.0, 0.9 and 0.7 percent respectively. Corporate tax collection is low in 
Indonesia and Bangladesh despite relatively high tax rates partly because of various tax 
incentives and concessions that governments often provide for attracting investment and for 
activities seen as having social or economic merit. 
 
 
 
Besides reducing tax revenue collections, there are other potential costs to tax incentive 
schemes. Tax incentives often become politicized with resources being captured by interest 
groups. If lobbying power is concentrated among high income groups, tax incentives and 
concessions would be expected to reduce the progressivity of corporate income taxation. 
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Figure 1: Corporate income tax as a percent of GDP and corporate income tax rate
(2009 or latest available year)
Source: IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL, KPMG
Note: Sorted from highest to lowest tax revenue as percent of GDP
* Unweighted average
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Another difficulty with tax incentives schemes is that they are often poorly targeted and to a 
large extent just subsidize activities that firms would have undertaken regardless of the 
policies. 
 
Personal income taxation is another important part of countries’ tax collection. Figure 2 plots 
personal income tax revenue as a percent of GDP and the top personal (statutory) marginal 
income tax rate. It shows that personal income tax collection is low in Asia compared to the 
rest of the world, OECD countries and developing economies excluding Asia. On average, 
Asian countries collect about 2.2 percent of personal income tax as a percent of GDP 
compared to an all country average of 5.2 percent and 8.8 and 2.7 percent in OECD and 
developing countries excluding Asia. Partly contributing to this relatively low tax take are 
higher tax free (minimum exempt) thresholds and a higher threshold of income above which 
the top marginal personal income tax rate applies. 
 
Figure 3 plots the ratio of the tax free threshold / individual allowance or deduction to gross 
national income per capita. It shows that Nepal and Pakistan, at 3.8 and 3.95, have the 
highest ratios. Only Korea, Japan and Cambodia have ratios below the average of OECD 
countries. The higher the tax free threshold, the larger tends to be the number of people 
exempt from income taxation and the higher the statutory tax rates that are needed to finance 
government expenditure. 
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Figure 2: Personal income tax as a percent of GDP and top personal marginal income tax rate
(2009 or latest available year)
Source: IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL, KPMG
Note: Sorted from highest to lowest tax revenue as percent of GDP
* Unweighted average
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Figure 4 plots the ratio of the top personal income tax threshold to per capita gross national 
income. At 0.45 Hong Kong has the lowest ratio, while Laos, Vietnam and Pakistan have the 
highest thresholds, at 388, 444 and 567 percent of per capita gross national income. 
 
 
 
Also contributing to the relatively low personal income tax take in some Asian countries are 
narrow personal income tax bases, which exempt certain types of income or tax them at 
lower rates. In China, for example, only certain listed types of income (eleven categories) are 
liable to tax. Some of these categories are taxed at progressive rates, while others are taxed at 
a flat rate. For labor income, wages and salaries are taxed at a progressive rate with a top 
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Figure 3: Ratio of tax free threshold / individual allowance or deduction to gross national income 
per capita (2012)
Source: IBFD, Asian Development Bank, own calculations
Note: Gross national income per capita for Asian countries is assumed to grow at the 2000 to 2010 rates.
* Unweighted average, data are for 2009 or 2008, no data are available for Turkey
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Figure 4: Ratio of top personal income tax threshold to gross national income per capita (2012)
Source: IBFD, Asian Development Bank, OECD, own calculations
Note: Gross national income per capita for Asian countries is assumed to grow at the 2000 to 2010 rates.
* Unweighted average, data are for 2009 or 2008, no data are available for Turkey
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marginal rate of 45 percent, but the remuneration of personal services is taxed at a flat rate of 
20 percent after a deduction of 20 percent of the payment as deemed expense. Interest is also 
generally taxed at a flat rate (20 percent), while royalties and rental and lease income are 
taxed at 20 and 10 percent respectively, with a 20 percent deduction being allowed. 
Moreover, certain types of income (e.g. monetary awards, interest on government bonds and 
on savings in a deposit account with Chinese banks) and certain benefits in kind (e.g. 
provision of or reimbursement for reasonable expenses on accommodation, travel expenses 
and allowances for children’s education) are exempt from personal income taxation 
altogether. 
 
A further important contributor to countries’ tax collection are general taxes on goods and 
services, which include value added (goods and services) taxes, general sales taxes, and 
turnover taxes. They are plotted in Figure 5 as a percent of GDP together with countries’ 
indirect tax rate, which generally coincides with the general value added tax (VAT) rate. The 
figure shows that general taxes on goods and services, similarly to personal income tax, are 
low in Asia, averaging 3.3 percent of GDP compared to an all country average of 6.4 percent 
and 6.9 and 6.6 percent in developing countries excluding Asia and OECD economies. This 
lower tax take partly results from lower indirect tax rates. Among Asian countries, Japan and 
Singapore, at 5 percent, and Thailand, at 7 percent, have one of the lowest indirect tax rates 
in the world. 
 
 
 
At 2.2 percent of GDP, the Philippines has the lowest collection of general taxes on goods 
and services (consisting of value added taxes) despite its 12 percent indirect tax rate. The low 
value added tax revenues are largely due to the low efficiency of the VAT system. An 
efficiency ratio, plotted in Figure 6, can be calculated as VAT revenues to GDP divided by 
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Figure 5: General taxes on goods and services as a percent of GDP and indirect tax rate
(2009 or latest available year)
Source: IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL, KPMG
Note: Sorted from highest to lowest tax revenue as percent of GDP
* Unweighted average
 Government Fiscal Policies and Redistribution in Asian Countries 31 
the standard statutory VAT rate (expressed as a percentage). A low efficiency ratio is taken 
as evidence of erosion by exemptions, reduced rates within the tax law and/or low taxpayer 
compliance (Ebrill et al., 2001). Bangladesh has the second least efficient VAT system in 
Asia. 
 
 
 
Singapore also has a relatively low efficiency given the breadth of its VAT base, resulting 
from an extremely high registration threshold of annual taxable turnover above SGD 1 
million or about USD 620,000 (Figure 7). 
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Figure 6: VAT efficiency ratio (2009 or latest available year)
Source: IMF, OECD, KPMG, PWC, Department of Statistics Singapore, own calculations
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Figure 7: VAT registration threshold in U.S. dollars (2012)
Source: IBFD, Asian Development Bank, OECD, own calculations
Note: Average exchange rates 2000 to 2010 are used.
* Unweighted average, data are for 2011
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Although the number of countries with a VAT system has been rising rapidly (Martinez-
Vazquez and Bird, 2011), several Asian economies have not adopted a value added tax. They 
include Bhutan, Hong Kong, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives and Myanmar. India also does not 
have a value added tax in the traditional sense. A central sales tax is levied on the movement 
of goods between states and a central value added tax is levied on all goods that are produced 
or manufactured in India. 
 
Lower reliance on value added taxes in Asian countries is likely to increase the economic 
costs of taxation as value added taxes are one of the least distortionary taxes (Auerbach 2008; 
Banks and Diamond 2010). The economic costs of value added taxes are lower because 
typically, VAT is charged at a uniform, relatively low rate to a (more or less) comprehensive 
and broad base. This lowers the economic costs of taxation, which tend to increase with 
higher tax rates and narrower tax bases. Moreover, value added taxes, in theory, do not 
distort business or export decisions. This is because the tax paid on production inputs and 
exports is deductible. Also, value added taxes are less distortionary than other taxes because 
they do not affect savings and investment decisions, i.e. they do not distort between current 
and future consumption. 
 
 
Tax administration and compliance costs 
 
Limited information is available on tax administration costs in Asian countries. Figure 8 plots 
tax administration expenditure as a percent of GDP for six Asian countries, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, and the OECD economies. It shows that 
administration costs in Asia are relatively low, at least in the countries for which data are 
available. This is partly because of less revenue collection. Also contributing to low tax 
administration expenditure in Indonesia, India, Singapore and Korea is efficient tax 
administration. This can be seen in Figure 9 which compares the administrative costs of 
collecting 100 units of revenue. Indonesia has the 7th lowest costs, India the 10th lowest, while 
Singapore and Korea rank 13th and 14th, respectively. 
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The ease with which taxpayers are able to comply with the tax system varies across countries. 
Figure 10 plots the total time to comply with taxes in hours per year. Compliance costs in 
Asia are lowest in Maldives (largely because Maldives does not levy taxes on goods and 
services or income taxes other than on the net profit of banks based on their annual financial 
statements), Hong Kong and Singapore. They are highest in China, Pakistan and Vietnam, 
partly because of complicated tax systems in these countries. 
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* Data are for 2007
Figure 8: Tax administration expenditure as percent of GDP (2009)
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Figure 9: Tax administration costs to net revenue collections
(2009, costs per 100 units of revenue)
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Complicated tax systems increase tax administration and compliance costs as well as the 
opportunity for tax planning and tax avoidance. Moreover, narrow base, high rate tax systems 
are often seen as unfair because higher income taxpayers generally have greater scope and 
resources to shift income to avoid higher tax rates. Unfair tax systems can reduce people’s 
and businesses’ willingness to pay taxes and hence the government’s ability to raise 
financing to fund government expenditure. 
 
The above discussion suggests the following. Some Asian countries have relatively high tax 
rate and narrow base tax systems. This may reduce the efficiency of tax collection. Moreover, 
these types of tax system are often seen as unfair. They increase tax administration and 
compliance costs and may affect governments’ ability to raise taxes. In addition, there seems 
to be greater reliance on corporate income taxation in Asia, which tends to be more 
distortionary (because of internationally mobile capital) than personal income taxation and 
value added taxes. 
 
 
Government expenditure policies 
 
Turning to government expenditures, Asia has made considerable progress in improving 
education and health outcomes and toward achieving the millennium development goals 
(MDGs) and targets. The millennium development goals were adopted by world leaders in 
September 2000 to reduce extreme poverty with a deadline of achieving a series of targets by 
2015. The second millennium development goal focuses on education (achieving universal 
primary education) and goals four to six center on health (reducing child mortality; 
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Source: World Bank
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improving maternal health; and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases). Progress 
in Asian countries has been substantial particularly in education. 
 
Primary school enrollment and the number of students who start grade one and reach the last 
grade of primary education have been rising and several countries have achieved or are 
expected to reach the set goals by 2015. Moreover, literacy rates in Asia are high. Most Asian 
countries have rates that are above the world average and those economies with rates below 
(Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan) have made considerable progress 
to raise them. These achievements are likely to be a contributing factor in our finding that 
education expenditure is reducing income inequality in Asia as government spending on 
primary education has been found to be progressive. 
 
Progress has also been made toward improving health conditions. Maternal death rates have 
fallen sharply in Asia with better attendance at birth of trained health professionals and 
improved antenatal care. Infant and child mortality rates are also falling although only a few 
countries so far have reached the MDG target. The progress that has been made is likely to 
have benefitted poor families in particular as infant and child mortality is closely related to 
household wealth. Infants in poor households are often less than half as likely to survive their 
first year of life than those in higher wealth households (Asian Development Bank, 2011). 
Death and incidence rates of tuberculosis also have been declining. But HIV/AIDS remains a 
problem with the percentage of the population with comprehensive, correct knowledge about 
the illness and the percentage of the population with advanced HIV infection who have 
access to antiretroviral drugs being relatively low and only rising slowly in some countries 
from a low base.  
 
For social protection, overall coverage remains relatively low in Asia and generally is only 
available to formal sector workers, in the civil service or large enterprises. Moreover, the 
availability of social protection programs does not necessarily imply that they are well 
designed, have wide coverage or are financially sustainable (Asher, 2010). Few countries 
have income support systems for the unemployed (e.g. Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, 
Thailand, China, Mauritius and Vietnam) with coverage rates in terms of the proportion of 
unemployed who receive benefits being less than 10 percent on average (International Labor 
Office, 2010). Effective coverage of work related accidents and diseases is also low with only 
a proportion of accidents being reported and compensated. In the informal sector, 
unemployment coverage is virtually non-existent and working conditions and safety are 
typically poor and work related diseases are widespread. 
 
With regard to income security in old age, although some Asian countries have made efforts 
to extend coverage beyond the formal sector, the proportion of working age population 
covered by contributory programs remains low at around 20 percent (International Labor 
Office, 2010) and few countries have social pensions to provide safety net retirement income 
for people who were not members of a formal scheme. Moreover, pension systems in Asian 
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countries, outside the OECD, are often quite generous due to early retirement ages and 
relatively high pension levels (OECD, 2012). According to OECD estimates, replacement 
rates, which measure the value of a person’s pension as the percentage of their earnings when 
working, are well above OECD levels for men in Asia, especially in China, Pakistan and 
Vietnam. The high replacement rates are partly due to nearly all defined-benefit schemes 
being based on final salaries rather than average earnings. Such schemes tend to be 
particularly regressive because the higher paid typically have salaries that rise more rapidly 
with age, while the earnings of lower paid workers generally remain flat or rise less fast. 
Furthermore, the OECD estimates that the expected amount of time that people spend in 
retirement, which can be calculated by combining information on national pension ages and 
life expectancy, is relatively high in Asia. Pension eligibility ages are particularly low for 
both men and women in Malaysia and Sri Lanka and for women in China and Thailand. 
 
The above discussion offers some potential explanation for our finding that education and 
health expenditures in Asia have reduced income inequality, while social security spending 
has mainly benefitted higher income people. Basic education and health services seem to be 
fairly universally available, whereas social protection spending has been restricted to those 
already likely to be better off, i.e. people employed in the formal sector. This suggests that 
labor market reform that moves workers from informal to formal employment, may offer the 
greatest scope of reducing income inequality in Asia. Higher formal employment should also 
raise personal income tax collection, which could further assist governments in achieving 
redistributive objectives. 
 
 
VI. Conclusions and policy lessons 
 
This paper assessed the impact of government fiscal policies on income inequality in Asia. It 
discussed the role and effectiveness of redistributive fiscal policies and quantified the effects 
of taxation and government expenditure on income distributions. Panel estimation for 150 
countries with data between 1970 and 2009 confirmed international empirical findings for 
Asia. Tax systems tend to be progressive but government expenditures are a more effective 
tool for redistributing income. 
 
Government expenditures on health and education were found to reduce income inequality in 
Asia and the rest of the world. Moreover, the results suggested some distinctive differential 
distributive effect for government spending on social protection. Social protection 
expenditure in Asia appears to increase income inequality, whereas it reduces it in the rest of 
the world. Also adversely affecting the distribution of income in Asian countries is 
government expenditure on housing. 
 
For taxation, policies in Asia were found to have a less distinctive differential distributive 
impact. However, the results provided some evidence that personal income taxes are more 
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progressive in Asia than in the rest of the world, possibly because of a larger number of 
people not paying income tax. Corporate income taxes, on the other hand, may be less 
progressive. This could be due to larger tax incentives, exemptions and concessions for Asian 
firms. 
 
Although taxes by themselves are less effective in redistributing income, taxation is crucial to 
raise financing for government expenditure to achieve distributional objectives through 
spending programs on social welfare and the social sectors, such as health and education 
policies. The discussion in this paper suggested that taxes could be raised more efficiently in 
some Asian countries. Practically speaking, an efficient tax system is one that reduces the 
disincentive effects of taxation to work, save and invest by using broad bases and low fairly 
uniform rates. A broad base, low rate system also reduces administration and compliance 
costs and is often seen as more fair than a narrow base system because of horizontal equity 
considerations (taxpayers who have the same income should pay the same amount in taxes) 
and vertical equity concerns (people with different incomes should pay different amounts of 
tax). 
 
The tax systems in several Asian countries are characterized by relatively high tax rates and 
narrow bases. Moreover, there seems to be greater reliance on corporate income taxation, 
which tends to be more distortionary (because of internationally mobile capital) than personal 
income taxation and value added taxes. Tax reform in Asia should therefore focus on 
lowering income tax rates while broadening the tax base, i.e. abolishing tax incentives, 
exemptions and concessions. This would reduce the economic, compliance and 
administrative costs of taxation and likely lead to increases in tax revenue. Increases in tax 
revenue, in turn, would allow greater government expenditure to achieve distributional 
objectives. Further gains could be achieved in some countries by shifting the tax burden from 
income taxation to value added taxes and broadening the value added tax base. Currently, 
VAT exemptions and/or reduced tax rates for necessities are often used to address the 
potential regressivity of value added taxes. However, they are costly and not well targeted to 
the poor. A more effective policy would be direct cash transfer payments to those in need. 
 
With respect to government spending policies, Asia has made substantial progress toward 
achieving the millennium development goals and targets on education and health. However, 
social protection policies generally remain limited in Asia and in countries where they exist 
they tend to have a narrow benefit coverage and lack targeting to the poor. For instance, 
unemployment benefits are typically restricted to those in formal employment and do not 
include the large proportion of people in informal work. Pensions are another example. In 
Asian countries, outside the OECD, pension systems are often quite generous due to early 
retirement ages and relatively high pension levels but they are typically only available to a 
privileged minority. 
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Appendix A: Description of variables and sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Gini Gini coefficient, expressed as a percentage World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008 
Net Net income Gini concept World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008 
Gross Gross income Gini concept World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008 
Population growth Annual population growth rate for year t is the 
exponential rate of growth of midyear population 
from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Youth dependency Ratio of younger dependents (people younger than 
15) to the working-age population (those ages 15-
64), expressed as the proportion of dependents per 
100 working-age population 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Old-age 
dependency 
Ratio of older dependents (people older than 64) to 
the working-age population (those ages 15-64), 
expressed as the proportion of dependents per 100 
working-age population 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Unemployment Number of people with continuous periods of 
unemployment extending for a year or longer, 
expressed as a percentage of the total unemployed 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Schooling Average years of total  Barro and Lee (2010) 
GDP per capita Annual GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Bank Development Indicators 
Inflation Annual percent change in consumer prices World Bank Development Indicators 
Globalization Globalization index Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008)  
Corruption Corruption index International Country Risk Guide, The PRS Group 
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PIT Personal income tax (percent of GDP) IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
Progress Average rate progression up to an income level 
equivalent to four times countries’ per capita GDP 
in local currency  
Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010) 
CIT Corporate income tax (percent of GDP) IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
SSC+Payroll Social security and payroll taxes (percent of GDP) IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
GTGS General taxes on goods and services (percent of 
GDP) 
IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
Excises Excises (percent of GDP) IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
Customs Customs duties (percent of GDP) IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
Total revenues Total government revenues (percent of GDP) IMF GFS Database, OECD Revenue Statistics, CEPAL 
Social protection Government expenditures on social protection 
(percent of GDP) 
IMF GFS Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
Education Government education expenditures (percent of 
GDP) 
IMF GFS Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
Health Government health expenditures (percent of GDP) IMF GFS Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
Housing Government housing expenditures (percent of 
GDP) 
IMF GFS Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database, 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
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Appendix B: Taxation and income inequality in Asia 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Gini-1 -0.071*** 0.078* 0.159*** 0.005 0.020 0.273*** -0.029* 
 (0.009) (0.043) (0.019) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) 
Net 4.257*** 3.558** 4.768*** 3.073** 5.771*** 6.079*** 3.691* 
 (0.494) (1.517) (0.676) (1.217) (1.794) (0.588) (1.950) 
Gross 3.829*** 6.633*** 3.863*** 3.580** 5.091*** 7.178*** 3.981** 
 (0.557) (1.766) (0.741) (1.522) (1.587) (0.821) (1.713) 
Population growth -0.084 -0.269 -0.139 0.351** 0.051 0.063 -0.178** 
 (0.060) (0.466) (0.125) (0.179) (0.179) (0.081) (0.077) 
Youth dependency -0.015 0.114** -0.076*** -0.027 0.041** -0.075*** -0.017 
 (0.022) (0.044) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.024) 
Old-age dependency -0.197** -0.360 -0.238* -0.290** -0.512*** -0.278*** -0.511*** 
 (0.079) (0.270) (0.126) (0.138) (0.178) (0.062) (0.119) 
Schooling -0.481*** -0.094 -0.494*** -0.208** -0.675*** -0.528*** -0.395*** 
 (0.028) (0.125) (0.064) (0.081) (0.105) (0.059) (0.070) 
Unemployment 0.093*** 0.069** 0.067*** 0.105*** 0.139*** 0.089*** 0.097*** 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012) 
GDP per capita  2.410*** 1.046 0.671 0.860 3.025*** 0.017 4.462*** 
 (0.710) (1.800) (1.095) (1.014) (0.838) (0.409) (0.942) 
(GDP per cap)^2 -0.192*** -0.108 -0.048 -0.083 -0.242*** 0.072* -0.335*** 
 (0.074) (0.198) (0.123) (0.102) (0.079) (0.043) (0.085) 
Globalization 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.078*** 0.103*** 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) 
Corruption 0.405*** 0.013 0.306*** 0.395*** 0.328*** 0.172*** 0.348*** 
 (0.028) (0.068) (0.020) (0.057) (0.043) (0.037) (0.030) 
Inflation 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.033** 0.069*** 0.101*** 0.079*** 0.068*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022) (0.012) 
Total revenues -0.015 0.040** -0.014 -0.046*** -0.113*** 0.000 -0.053*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) 
PIT  -0.041      
  (0.105)      
PIT*Asia  -0.532**      
  (0.222)      
PIT*Progress  -0.005***      
  (0.000)      
PIT*Progress*Asia  0.003      
  (0.011)      
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CIT   -0.338*     
   (0.193)     
CIT*Asia   0.936**     
   (0.394)     
CIT*Globalization   0.005**     
   (0.003)     
CIT*Globalization*Asia   -0.022***     
   (0.007)     
SSC+Payroll    0.165    
    (0.145)    
SSC+Payroll*Asia    1.159    
    (0.919)    
GTGS     0.768***   
     (0.134)   
GTGS*Asia     -0.102   
     (0.313)   
Excises      -0.059  
      (0.042)  
Excises*Asia      0.668***  
      (0.228)  
Customs       0.651*** 
       (0.165) 
Customs*Asia       -0.477 
       (0.575) 
Constant 33.404*** 22.215*** 30.954*** 31.699*** 29.774*** 25.715*** 34.261*** 
 (1.296) (4.094) (2.440) (2.747) (3.144) (1.556) (1.831) 
Number of observations 907 539 822 844 879 804 842 
Number of countries 77 53 74 72 76 70 73 
Sargan (p-value) 0.785 0.741 0.799 0.789 0.810 0.863 0.885 
AR2 (p-value) 0.374 0.349 0.344 0.344 0.418 0.235 0.319 
Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To interpret the coefficient estimates the following rule applies: Beta1*Var1+Beta2*Var1*Asia, where Beta1 and Beta2 are the estimated coefficients, Var1 
is the variable in question, and Asia is the dummy variable that equals one if the country is in Asia and zero otherwise. Thus, for Asian countries the 
marginal effect of variable Var1 is equal to (Beta1+Beta2), while for the rest of the world it is Beta1 (since Asia = 0). 
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Appendix C: Government expenditure and income inequality in Asia 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gini-1 -0.071*** -0.102*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.158*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.026) 
Net 4.257*** 7.155*** 5.902*** -0.021 6.192*** 
 (0.494) (1.991) (1.411) (2.340) (1.348) 
Gross 3.829*** 6.249*** 3.087** -1.404 4.657*** 
 (0.557) (2.298) (1.483) (2.213) (1.336) 
Population growth -0.084 0.038 0.430** 0.510*** 2.419*** 
 (0.060) (0.232) (0.170) (0.191) (0.648) 
Youth dependency -0.015 0.027 -0.035 0.042 0.141*** 
 (0.022) (0.040) (0.060) (0.038) (0.037) 
Old-age dependency -0.197** -0.244 -0.678 -0.473** -0.436 
 (0.079) (0.154) (0.440) (0.188) (0.286) 
Schooling -0.481*** 0.135 -0.393*** -0.512*** -0.189 
 (0.028) (0.174) (0.121) (0.144) (0.172) 
Unemployment 0.093*** 0.123*** 0.076*** 0.119*** 0.109*** 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) 
GDP per capita  2.410*** 2.190 1.562 3.186*** 0.106 
 (0.710) (1.540) (1.705) (0.973) (1.605) 
(GDP per cap)^2 -0.192*** -0.282 -0.177 -0.288*** -0.150 
 (0.074) (0.182) (0.152) (0.102) (0.135) 
Globalization 0.101*** 0.080*** 0.137*** 0.141*** 0.239*** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Corruption 0.405*** 0.116 0.133 0.211** 0.274** 
 (0.028) (0.113) (0.112) (0.105) (0.128) 
Inflation 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.068*** 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022) 
Total revenues -0.015 -0.053** -0.052** -0.000 0.019 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.022) (0.012) (0.018) 
Social protection  -0.276***    
  (0.058)    
Social protection*Asia  0.766    
  (0.591)    
Education   -0.034   
   (0.133)   
Education*Asia   -0.452   
   (0.566)   
Health    -0.330***  
    (0.089)  
Health*Asia    0.089  
    (1.474)  
Housing     -0.614*** 
     (0.144) 
Housing*Asia     2.776*** 
     (0.974) 
Constant 33.404*** 31.406*** 39.847*** 35.601*** 19.474*** 
 (1.296) (3.561) (7.068) (4.293) (4.476) 
Number of observations 907 596 625 672 482 
Number of countries 77 64 65 70 60 
Sargan (p-value) 0.785 0.801 0.731 0.756 0.798 
AR2 (p-value) 0.374 0.345 0.307 0.300 0.405 
Standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
See Appendix B for the interpretation of the interaction terms.
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Appendix D: Joint effect of taxation and government expenditure on income 
inequality in Asia 
 
 (1) 
+
 (2) 
++
 (3) 
+++
 
Gini-1 -0.092* -0.077 -0.169*** 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.064) 
Net 2.925 7.384*** 3.131** 
 (3.605) (0.881) (1.321) 
Gross 5.081 6.053*** 8.616*** 
 (3.361) (1.083) (1.855) 
Population growth -0.496 1.632*** 1.201* 
 (0.837) (0.533) (0.715) 
Youth dependency 0.073 0.193 0.035 
 (0.187) (0.125) (0.179) 
Old-age dependency 0.896 -0.663** -0.010 
 (0.747) (0.274) (0.393) 
Schooling -0.011 -0.401 -0.910 
 (0.560) (0.588) (0.707) 
Unemployment 0.157 0.186** 0.069 
 (0.151) (0.083) (0.125) 
GDP per capita  -3.478 1.362 -5.423 
 (4.112) (3.191) (3.842) 
(GDP per cap)^2 0.331 -0.179 0.357 
 (0.423) (0.289) (0.357) 
Globalization -0.157 0.152** 0.048 
 (0.183) (0.063) (0.116) 
Corruption -0.120 0.426 0.267 
 (0.265) (0.265) (0.321) 
Inflation 0.132 0.073 0.094 
 (0.269) (0.078) (0.261) 
PIT 0.580  -0.145 
 (0.545)  (0.242) 
PIT*Asia 1.792   
 (1.442)   
PIT*Progress -0.005***  -0.005 
 (0.001)  (0.005) 
PIT*Progress*Asia 0.119   
 (0.154)   
CIT -2.342  -2.067 
 (3.553)  (1.926) 
CIT*Asia -2.853   
 (3.875)   
CIT*Globalization 0.027  0.026 
 (0.045)  (0.024) 
CIT*Globalization*Asia 0.066   
 (0.074)   
SSC+Payroll -0.149  -0.328 
 (0.487)  (0.259) 
SSC+Payroll*Asia -0.026   
 (1.916)   
GTGS 0.294  0.180 
 (0.849)  (0.347) 
GTGS*Asia 0.666   
 (1.380)   
Excises 0.079  0.522 
 (0.452)  (0.452) 
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Excises*Asia 4.467   
 (3.655)   
Customs -1.009  -1.147 
 (1.258)  (0.982) 
Customs*Asia 3.634   
 (3.691)   
Social protection  -0.338** -0.074 
  (0.135) (0.142) 
Social protection*Asia  0.845 3.402*** 
  (0.620) (1.020) 
Education  -0.162 -1.406*** 
  (0.291) (0.486) 
Education*Asia  0.037 0.161*** 
  (0.026) (0.049) 
Health  -0.211 -0.023 
  (0.268) (0.412) 
Health*Asia  -0.582 -2.263*** 
  (0.411) (0.674) 
Housing  0.049 0.352 
  (0.235) (0.531) 
Housing*Asia  0.274 0.640*** 
  (0.177) (0.179) 
Constant 26.766* 9.369 0.000 
 (16.234) (13.970) (0.000) 
Number of observations 520 409 258 
Number of countries 52 54 41 
Sargan (p-value) 0.890 0.751 0.721 
AR2 (p-value) 0.389 0.368 0.371 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
See Appendix B for the interpretation of the interaction terms. 
+
 Tax policy variables are jointly significant at 1% level. 
++
 Government spending variables are jointly significant at 10% level. 
+++
 Since the interaction terms between the tax variables and “Asia” are dropped in the estimation due to 
collinearity, estimated coefficients on tax variables refer to the world average (including Asian countries in 
the sample). 
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